One of my greatest pleasures this semester has been a course I am taking on the philosophy of Duns Scotus, a medieval Franciscan thinker often over-shadowed by Aquinas due to some unfortunate turns of events in the last 700 years. Selfishly, I enjoy studying his philosophy because of the great emphasis he places on Will. Moving beyond the stupid pun, I do believe Scotus has a conception of the will with the potential to adequately address some issues that arise when speaking about free will and evil. In my experience, the issue of freedom and good/evil is one that can send the mind in circles. If freedom has to do with having options, shouldn't all free beings be able to choose evil? If a being cannot choose evil, how can it be free? Also, when speaking about the will, there is a tendency to subordinate it to the intellect so that the fine-tuned will is one that is perfectly submissive to "reason" (whatever that means). In other words, the mark of a perfectly rational being is one whose will is conditioned to do whatever right reason tells it to do. Obviously, I'm painting in broad strokes here, but this is a blog, after all, and I'm a busy guy.
I think Scotus turns the tables on some of these common notions of rationality. Instead of emphasizing the intellect as the primary rational capacity, he sees the will as prior. His reasons are numerous for this. First, he states that the will is the only power of man that is not necessitated towards its ends. The will can choose to act or not to act; it is not impelled either way. He backs up this notion by appealing to experience: next time you do something reflect on the fact that you could have done otherwise. Secondly, there is the mere fact that you must choose to use reason, reason does not choose itself. Linked to this understanding is Scotus' notion of the two affections of the will: the affectio commodi and the affectio justitiae. The first of these is man's natural inclination to do what is best for himself, the second is his inclination to will the good for itself. Scotus does not pick a side here and claim one to be good and the other evil, but says that both affections of the will are good and necessary for man to flourish. After all, if we had no desire to do what was best for ourselves, why would we will the good for itself, if it is the best thing for us?
So, what does all of this lead to? Scotus, by holding to the two affections of the will, sees that the will is the power most constitutive of a rational being, not the intellect. To Scotus, to be free is to will the good for itself, not to will the good because you have to will the good. He does not denigrate the importance of the intellect in determining man's pursuits, but he also does not think that the will is merely an unruly force to be harnessed by reason. Also, for Scotus, to be free does not necessarily include the capacity for evil. Freedom is the capacity to will the good for itself, which, in man, is finite due to his own finitude, but also includes the admixture of being able to commit evil, as the will is not necessitated towards the good. On the other hand, a being such as God, for Scotus, who has the perfection of being in Himself, always wills what is good in itself because of His own primordial goodness and desire for all to exist in Him. God is not limited by a Platonic form of "goodness" because He is goodness (A topic for another time and place: Scotus holds that the natural moral law, viewed as necessary by many Catholic thinkers, is contingent apart from the command to love God above all things).
Who knew how important I was?
Will you are full of it (will) :)
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