It has been two and a half long weeks since TMTKI has graced the internet with some of the pithiest philosophical analysis anyone could ever hope to come across, but I assure you that it was not forgotten during my Oregonian/GRE-related endeavors, as I must have thought about this blog for at least fifteen entire minutes in that time. So do not fear--there are surely abundant fruits to be reaped from that intense quarter hour of reflection...so sit back, grab a beverage and enjoy reading for the next few minutes or so!
One of the most central philosophical questions that is discussed amongst those who are brave enough to involve themselves in such crazy activities is the query, "What is truth?" Certainly, I cannot answer this for you succinctly (or at all), but I would like to enter into a phenomenological analysis of some of the ways that the word seems to be used in everyday speech as a potential springboard into the thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
I would think that the most common usage of the word "truth" is in reference to whether something has or has not occurred. For example, it is frequently the case that, when a person is confronted with shocking or outlandish news, they will ask, "Is this true?" On this account, one possible interpretation of the word "truth," or its adjectival counterpart "true," could be loosely defined as "what is the case." If you were a real dork, you could ask "Is this what is the case?" instead of "Is this true?" and it would mean the same thing. But, if we really think about it, is "that which is the case" an acceptable definition for truth/true? If so, then is there any real distinction between truth and reality? Perhaps you may not see this as a problem, but I would like to entertain further possible meanings of truth before I let this topic die.
Another possible meaning for "truth," I think, in our common language example is "an accurate account of what is the case." This is an important distinction, because this means that truth is not "that which is," but rather "an accurate account of that which is." We seem to have a potential distinction in common language, then, between reality ("that which is") and truth ("an accurate account of that which is"). Therefore, in order to have truth, one must not only have something "out there" which really exists, but also an account or description of this by means of language. At this point, I would like to bring in my good friend, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who would probably agree with this point at a rudimentary level. In his early work, he sees truth as a linguistic expression of that which is given in perception. He believes truth is never exhaustive of the original phenomenon it expresses, as the original phenomenon ("that which is/was") is also the most meaningful giver of itself, not what can be said about it. For Merleau-Ponty, there is always something more that truth cannot cover because it is a second-tier entity made possible only by the original phenomenon.
Now, I'm sure some may be starting to sweat a bit, as fears of relativism start to creep into their minds. "No truth without language? No statement is ever completely true? Absurd!" Allow me to (hopefully) allay your concerns. Merleau-Ponty was no relativist. Rather, he saw language as the medium through which truth comes into being. For Merleau-Ponty, language as truth-making is akin to art in that it must exquisitely give expression to the primary phenomenon that inspires it. He claims that truth can never fully express phenomena not because he thinks that truth is relative, but because there is always something left out of language that the original phenomenon possesses. Back to our common language example, when someone asks whether something is true or not, they can be answered because truth is measured by expression of and adherence to the phenomenon. Additionally, when someone asks you to "tell the truth," you can do this with varying degrees of success. A terse, reticent, true answer can be given while a descriptive, trenchant, true answer can also be given. I am inclined to say that the second is more true, because it more authentically expresses reality than the former, although neither would be false. To give another common language example, I believe Merleau-Ponty would be a fan of the saying "there is some truth to that," as he does not see truth and falsity as being black and white (a binary), but rather as a variegated spectrum of possibilities. Some things are more or less true (or false) than others, on his account. This is why Merleau-Ponty describes the task of the philosopher as the "laying down of being." Being must be pinned down and explored through the medium of language, of truth-making, as without this there would be no philosophy. Language and truth, being expressive of being, add new dimensions to it that previously did not exist.
Certainly Merleau-Ponty's account of truth does not tell the whole story (this would contradict his whole claim), but I think it is an interesting step in the right direction as far as gaining an understanding of what truth is. There is much more to be said about Merleau-Ponty, and my brief overview of his theory does not do it justice. He certainly views language as something much more robust than simply speech, and I do not wish to suggest that truth is found only in spoken/written communication. To conclude, I would simply like to point out that it is not surprising to me that in the Christian tradition, Jesus Christ is referred to both as the Truth and the Word. I cannot embark on an exegesis at this time, but I think there is much good fruit to be found from a reflection on this topic, and I hope this post has expanded your horizons a bit.
Peace be with you,
William
CUFC- If you ever get a chance, visit the state of Oregon, as it is one of the most beautiful regions of the country.
